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 And how bitterly Job protested to God that, though he had been just, he was so 
afflicted by calamities. In Job’s case God himself solved this difficulty with his own 
living voice, and justified his right with arguments drawn not from Job’s sin but from 
his own power. … Where were you, he says, when I laid the foundations of the earth? 
Thomas Hobbes, De Cive XV.61 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Spinoza argues in his Theological-Political Treatise (TTP) that right is coextensive 
with power. Even on a very minimal construal of rights as something like permissions, the 
view will strike many as beyond the pale. Yet Spinoza is characteristically unmoved by 
ordinary intuitions, and seeks to follow the argument (henceforth ‘the TTP argument’) where 
he thinks it leads: 
 
For it’s certain that nature, considered absolutely, has the supreme right to do everything 
it can [jus summum habere ad omnia, quae potest], i.e., that the right of nature extends as 
far as its power does. For the power of nature is the power of God itself [naturae enim 
potentia ipsa Dei potentia est], and he has the supreme right over all things. But the 
universal power of the whole of nature is nothing but the power of all individuals together 
[universalis potentia totius naturae nihil est praeter potentiam omnium individuorum 
simul]. From this it follows that each individual has a supreme right to do everything it 
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can, or that the right of each thing extends as far as its determinate power does. (TTP 
16.3-4, G III/189)2 
 
Thus Spinoza seeks to ground his practical claim that right is coextensive with power in 
metaphysical claims about the relationships between God, the whole of nature, and finite 
things. And this practical claim is subsequently used to develop an account of the state’s 
political legitimacy, that is, an account of the process by which individual humans give 
authority [potestas] to the state [imperium], and of their reasons for doing this.3 It is only due 
to a transfer of right that ‘we’re bound to carry out absolutely all the commands of the 
supreme power’ (TTP 16.25).  
Scholars who have examined the TTP argument have responded to it in several 
different ways. Some hold that it is valid, at least when it is supplemented by background 
assumptions drawn from Spinoza’s Ethics, and that the argument ultimately provides a good 
reason to accept the conclusion. Alexandre Matheron, for instance, writes that the argument 
is ‘completely rigorous’ once we take into account certain metaphysical views developed in 
Ethics 1 and 3.4 On this reading, someone who has already taken on board the lessons of the 
Ethics will naturally be led by the TTP argument to agree that right is coextensive with 
power. Others, such as Edwin Curley, agree that the argument has no formal flaws but 
criticize it for relying on premises that are unwarranted or unpersuasive given its dialectical 
context.5 On such a reading, although the argument is formally valid, it is nevertheless 
illegitimate for other (informal) reasons, and thus ultimately unsuccessful. 
Both of these lines of interpretation agree that the TTP argument is valid. By contrast, 
I will argue in sections 2-3 that, by his own lights, Spinoza ought not to have accepted the 
TTP argument. There are two flaws in Spinoza’s reasoning that undermine the argument, 
even given the resources of the Ethics. First, the argument assumes that finite individuals 
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inherit the property of having right coextensive with their power solely because they are part 
of a whole (the ‘whole of nature’) that has this property. But this form of argument from 
division is not valid in general, and I shall argue that examination of similar cases in the 
Ethics reveals that Spinoza ought to reject it in this particular case. Moreover, considering 
similar cases from the Ethics highlights a further flaw in the TTP argument. It trades on an 
equivocation between two different senses of ‘nature’: (i) nature conceived as substance, 
absolute and active, and (ii) nature conceived as mode, divisible and passive. Yet these two 
senses of ‘nature’ are not interchangeable salva veritate. Thus, even if we take Spinoza’s 
monistic metaphysics on board, his account of natural right does not follow from the given 
premises.  
Spinoza does, however, revisit the core ideas of the TTP argument in his last, 
unfinished work, the Political Treatise (TP). There, too, he draws the conclusion that right is 
coextensive with power. However, his argument for this conclusion is different: 
 
For since God has the right over all things, and God’s right is nothing but his power 
itself insofar as [his power] is considered to be absolutely free [jus Dei nihil aliud est 
quam ipsa Dei potentia quatenus haec absolute libera consideratur], it follows that 
each natural thing has as much right by nature as it has power to exist and have 
effects. For the power of each natural thing, by which it exists and has effects, is 
nothing but the very power of God, which is absolutely free.  (TP 2.3, G III/276-77) 
 
The difference is subtle, but logically significant.6 In the TTP argument, Spinoza relies on the 
whole of nature as an intermediary between God and individuals, while in the revised 
argument no reference is made to the whole of nature. Why does he make this change? My 
proposal in section 4 will be that in the period after the publication of the TTP, his continued 
 4	
work on the Ethics led him to recognize the logical pitfalls facing the TTP argument. The 
revised argument relies neither on an argument from division nor on an equivocal conception 
of nature, but rather on the idea—central to the Ethics—that each individual’s power is an 
expression of God’s power. Identifying the flaws in the TTP argument thus reveals both 
Spinoza’s likely motive for revising it, as well as the specific way in which the revision is an 
improvement on the original. 
 
2. INTERPRETING THE TTP ARGUMENT 
Spinoza’s TTP argument for the view that right is coextensive with power has 
received relatively little criticism in scholarship on his political philosophy, perhaps because 
the arguments seem relatively straightforward. Since I wish to make the case that the 
argument relies on a move that is anything but straightforward, let me first paint a picture of 
the ways in which it has traditionally been interpreted.7 
Some scholars who address the argument at TTP 16.3-4 take it to go through without 
a hitch, at least if the truth of its premises is granted. And where such scholars have felt the 
premises need shoring up, they have typically supposed the materials for doing so are ready 
and waiting in the Ethics. The thought is that in these passages, Spinoza is implicitly drawing 
on the resources of his metaphysical system, though that system is not given full expression 
in the TTP. For instance, Susan James paraphrases the argument before mentioning a 
criticism raised by one of Spinoza’s correspondents: ‘[C]ritics such as Van Velthuysen would 
object that [the TTP argument] trades on the heterodox claim that the power of natural things 
to operate as they do is identical with the power of God…’8 James is referring to a letter in 
which Van Velthuysen attributes to Spinoza the view ‘that all things emanate from God by an 
inevitable necessity—or rather…that this whole universe is God’ (Letter 42, G IV/208). Van 
Velthuysen seems to grant that the various consequences that Spinoza wishes to draw do 
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follow from his premises. However, many of those premises—including the view that the 
power of nature is the power of God—are wildly unacceptable to him. In his view, Spinoza’s 
conception of God ‘destroys and completely subverts all worship and religion, secretly 
introduces atheism, or at least imagines a God who cannot move men to reverence for his 
Divinity’ (Letter 42, G IV/218). However, Van Velthuysen never attacks the validity of the 
TTP argument. He objects only to the truth of its key premise—an objection that, on James’ 
view, Spinoza could address using the resources of the Ethics (at E1pp29-30).9 Her implicit 
suggestion is that, if the argument is supplemented with propositions from the Ethics, the 
conclusion will follow: might and right go hand in hand. 
James’ approach to this topic is not out of the ordinary. It is a recent entry in a long 
interpretive tradition of developing and defending the TTP argument using the metaphysical 
picture developed in the Ethics. An older but still very influential example appears in 
Matheron’s discussion of this passage in Individu et communauté chez Spinoza. He 
optimistically describes the argument as a straightforward deduction that proceeds ‘more 
geometrico, by a simple reminder of what God really is and what relations he really bears to 
things.’10 However, he goes on to argue that one must rely on additional assumptions to rule 
out certain non-Spinozistic interpretations of the argument. After all, ‘There is no need to be 
Spinozist to recognize that the power which makes all natural reality exist and act is the very 
power of God.’11 To rule out these alternative interpretations, Matheron fills in the story 
using doctrines from the Ethics: 
 
God being an immanent cause of all things, each individual is himself a Deus 
quatenus; the divine strength through which we exist and act is therefore our own 
strength, aided and oriented by that of the other finite modes which determine us from 
step to step. And this strength, we know, merges with our conatus. This, 
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consequently, is a part of the infinite power of God: it is this power insofar as it gives 
itself the structure that defines our individual essence and insofar as it acts according 
to the laws of this structure. The conclusion, then, becomes completely rigorous: 
since the right of God is identified with his power, each Deus quatenus has as much 
right as it has strength…12 
 
Thus Spinoza’s reasoning is supposed to be valid as long as we take into account his whole 
metaphysical picture—specifically, Spinoza’s conception of God as an immanent cause of all 
things, which underlies the conatus doctrine of Ethics 3.13 And other scholars typically agree 
that the TTP argument can be made good using propositions from the Ethics, though they do 
not always agree about which propositions must be used. For instance, Warren Montag 
summarizes the argument as follows: 
 
Because nature, or God, does all it can do, and because for God not to do something 
that he could do would be an imperfection and God is perfect, ‘Nature’s right is 
coextensive with its power’. It thus follows that the individual things of which nature 
(or God) in its infinity is comprised have the ‘sovereign right’ to do the things that 
they are determined by nature as a whole to do.14 
 
Where Matheron takes the argument to rely on Spinoza’s view that God is an immanent 
cause of all things (developed at E1p18), Montag presents the argument as grounded in 
Spinoza’s account of God’s perfection (developed at E1p33s2).15 Much more recently, 
Daniel Frank and Jason Waller have provided an account of the argument that highlights its 
basis in Spinoza’s naturalism, since naturalism entails that ‘There can be no law that binds 
only on human beings.’16 Yet in spite of this nuanced disagreement about the ultimate 
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metaphysical foundations of Spinoza’s argument that right is coextensive with power, all of 
these authors agree that when we draw on the claims of the Ethics, the argument turns out to 
be valid. 
Moreover, those scholars who have raised criticisms of the TTP argument do not 
typically question its logical validity. As Curley paraphrases the argument, it runs as follows:  
 
God has absolute sovereignty, that is, the supreme right to do all things, that is, 
whatever he can do; but the power of nature (considered absolutely) simply is the 
power of God; therefore, nature (considered absolutely) has the right to do whatever it 
can do; but the power of the whole of nature is nothing but the power of all the 
individuals in nature; therefore, everything in nature has a right to do what it can do. 
Right is coextensive with power.17  
 
This paraphrase charitably irons out some rough spots, but nevertheless remains very close to 
the original text. Though he ultimately finds the argument unpersuasive, Curley does not 
suggest that the premises would fail to establish the conclusion. The only two problems he 
identifies are that (i) it is not an argument that ‘we might expect to be persuasive to Spinoza’s 
audience’ (320), for it relies heavily on the Spinozistic assumption that the power of God is 
identical with the power of nature; and (ii) the conclusion of the argument will ‘make trouble 
for the idea that the right of the state is founded on a social contract’ (322), because it entails 
that a government’s authority extends only as far as its subjects actually obey its 
commands.18  
Both of these observations seem right. The argument does draw on premises that 
many traditional theological and political thinkers would reject, and the whole thrust of the 
argument seems to be in tension with the idea that natural rights may be surrendered with the 
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establishment of a social contract.19 Nevertheless, from the perspective of someone who 
accepts Spinoza’s premises and is trying to decide whether to accept his conclusion as well, 
these points are not salient. The first problem presupposes a different audience, namely the 
liberal, philosophically sophisticated, but still religious readers that the TTP was apparently 
intended for.20 And the second problem simply does not pertain to whether the argument 
itself is any good. Although Curley’s objections are incisive, they do not aim to answer this 
question. 
The upshot is that many readers of Spinoza’s political writings, both critical and 
sympathetic, have held that the TTP argument is valid once his metaphysical doctrines are 
thrown into the mix as implicit premises. This is the point I wish to contest. 
 
3. TWO OBJECTIONS TO THE TTP ARGUMENT 
The flaws in the TTP argument that I want to highlight are not based on Spinoza’s 
identification of God and nature, which was the source of Van Velthuysen’s main concern. 
Rather, they are based on the logical relationship between the whole of nature and particular 
finite individuals. To see the difficulties the argument faces, let’s carve it at its joints, hewing 
as closely as possible to the original text. 
(1) The power of nature, considered absolutely, is the power of God itself. 
(2) God has supreme right over all things. 
(3) So, nature, considered absolutely, has the supreme right to do everything it can, i.e., 
the right of nature extends as far as its power does. (from 1, 2) 
(4) The universal power of the whole of nature is nothing but the power of all individuals 
together. 
(5) So, each individual has a supreme right to do everything it can, or the right of each 
thing extends as far as its determinate power does. (from 3, 4) 
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Spinoza goes on to connect this last claim to the conatus doctrine. However, I take it that the 
essential point—that right is coextensive with power—is already supposed to be established 
by step (5).  
 Neither of the inferences involved in this argument is valid as it stands. The first 
inference (to line (3)) is invalid without some further connection between God’s power and 
God’s right. Fortunately, Spinoza’s revised version of this argument in the TP makes clear 
what he takes the connection to be. There, he states that ‘God’s right is nothing but his power 
itself’ (TP 2.3, G III/276), which makes clear that God’s power is not merely coextensive 
with God’s right—they are identical. Thus the first inference Spinoza means to draw at TTP 
16.3-4 is: 
(1)  The power of nature, considered absolutely, is the power of God itself. 
(1a) God’s right is the power of God itself. (implicit premise) 
(2)  God has supreme right over all things. 
(3)  So, nature, considered absolutely, has supreme right over all things. (from 1-2) 
This inference is valid. Moreover, it does not trivialize the conclusion by presupposing that 
right is generally identical with power. Spinoza assumes only that God’s right is identical 
with God’s power.  
Of course, we may wonder what licenses this assumption. Curley has observed that in 
Spinoza’s historical context, it would be unwarranted simply to assume that God’s right is 
identical with or grounded in his power.21 Many proponents of the natural law tradition that 
Spinoza is apparently attempting to work within would reject that assumption.22 But again, 
the question of interest here is not whether Spinoza’s argument would have been acceptable 
to authors such as Grotius. The question is whether it is something that follows from 
Spinoza’s premises, whether explicit or implicit. And here the answer seems to be ‘Yes’—if 
God’s right just is God’s power, the conclusion follows. 
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 Yet even if the first inference in the TTP argument is repaired, the second inference is 
also invalid. The fact that (3) nature, considered absolutely, has supreme right over all things, 
combined with the fact that (4) the universal power of the whole of nature is nothing but the 
power of all individuals together, does not entail that (5) each individual has a supreme right 
to do everything it can. There are two problems with the argument as it stands, and neither 
admits of an obvious solution.  
The first problem is that the inference is not of a form that is generally valid. The 
properties of a composite whole are not in general mere aggregates of the properties of its 
component parts. And this is so even in many cases where we wish to deny that the whole is 
nothing more than the sum of its parts. There are cases in which the properties of a whole are 
merely aggregated from its parts; for instance, if the bicycle has the property of weighing less 
than twenty pounds, then it does follow that each part of the bicycle must share this property. 
But these are special cases. The fact that a whole has some property does not entail that its 
parts must share that property, even in a lesser degree. 
 One might reply that Spinoza simply takes this to be a domain in which this form of 
argument from division is valid. It has already been granted that there are special cases in 
which division is valid; perhaps natural right is one of them. On Spinoza’s understanding of 
the world, is there reason to take the property of having supreme right to do everything one 
can to aggregate from individuals to the whole of nature? That is, can Spinoza understand 
nature’s supreme right as the sum of the many particular rights held by its finite modes? 
Since ‘right’ is not defined in the Ethics, we can only consider the matter by way of analogy 
with other properties that are. Yet there are a number of similar properties that apply to 
nature (considered absolutely), that Spinoza clearly denies to finite individuals in any degree. 
It is worth considering several examples in which Spinoza would deny the validity of similar 
arguments. Examining such cases will help us to see why the Spinozist ought to deny the 
 11	
validity of the TTP argument as well: a similar error is at play in each case. Three examples 
should be sufficient to diagnose the problem. 
 
Case 1: Existence and essence. The notion of essence is closely related for Spinoza to 
the notion of power (see, e.g., E1p34 and 3p7), and thus to the notion of natural right. We 
might expect that, just as the supreme right of the whole of nature is the aggregate of the 
rights of finite individuals to do whatever they can, likewise the essence of the whole of 
nature must be the aggregate of the essences of finite individuals. Such expectations would 
be frustrated. In Spinoza’s view, there is a deep and critical difference between the essence of 
the whole of nature and the essence of any given individual. He argues that, in the case of 
substance—natura naturans, or nature, considered absolutely—existence and essence are one 
and the same. This thought appears as early as E1p11s: 
 
For things that come to be from external causes—whether they consist of many parts 
or few—owe all the perfection or reality they have to the power of the external cause; 
and therefore their existence arises only from the perfection of the external cause, and 
not from their own perfection. On the other hand, whatever perfection substance has 
is not owed to any external cause. So its existence must follow from its nature alone; 
hence its existence is nothing but its essence. (E1p11s; see also 1p20 and 1p24) 
 
However, in spite of the fact that God’s existence and essence are identical, and God is 
identical with nature, considered absolutely (E1p29s), Spinoza would deny that this implies 
an analogous claim about particular individuals. For finite individuals, essence and existence 
remain distinct.23 In fact, he takes it as axiomatic that ‘The essence of man does not involve 
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necessary existence’ (E2a1), which is another way of saying that essence and existence come 
apart in the case of human beings.  
In short, Spinoza would deny the validity of the following inference: 
(3')  The essence of nature, considered absolutely, is its existence. 
(4')  The existence of the whole of nature is nothing but the existence of all individuals 
together. 
(5')  So, the essence of each thing extends as far as its existence does. (from 3ʹ, 4’) 
The initial premise, (3′), follows from Spinoza’s identification of God with Nature, 
considered absolutely. Premise (4′) can be drawn from the same nominalism that leads 
Spinoza to accept (4) in the original TTP argument. But (5′) is a claim that Spinoza explicitly 
rejects. It is only in the case of God that existence and essence are unified. So here the 
Spinozist would reject an inference from a property of the whole of nature, considered 
absolutely, to a property of particular individuals. Moreover, the property in question is one 
that is closely related to power, and thus (on Spinoza’s view) to natural right. 
 
Case 2: Freedom. Another property that we would expect to be treated similarly to 
natural right is the property of freedom. After all, in his revised and more careful version of 
the argument in the TP, Spinoza does not simply say that God’s right is identical with his 
power; he says that ‘God’s right is nothing but his power itself, insofar as [his power] is 
considered to be absolutely free’ (TP 2.3, emphasis added). It is natural to suppose that just 
as finite individuals inherit a portion of God’s right, they likewise inherit a portion of God’s 
freedom. But this is not so. The concept of freedom is defined at the beginning of the Ethics 
as the property of existing and being determined to act solely in virtue of one’s nature 
(E1d7). With this definition on the table,  
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It follows…that God alone is a free cause. For God alone exists only from the 
necessity of his nature (by 1p11 and 1p14c1), and acts from the necessity of his nature 
(by 1p17). Therefore (by 1d7) God alone is a free cause, q.e.d.  (E1p17c2) 
 
So, as the passage suggests, Spinoza would reject an inference analogous to the one that 
appears in the TTP argument: 
(3'') Nature, considered absolutely (i.e., God), exists and acts from the necessity of its 
nature—that is, the whole of nature is free. 
(4'') The existence and power of the whole of nature is nothing but the existence and 
power of all individuals together. 
(5'')  So, to the extent that each thing exists and acts, it does so from the necessity of its 
nature, i.e., each thing exists and acts freely. (from 3′′, 4′′) 
He would accept the premises but reject the conclusion. Premise (3′′) follows from his 
identification of God and nature, considered absolutely (natura naturans, per E1p29s). And, 
as before, the nominalism that leads him to accept that ‘the universal power of the whole of 
nature is nothing but the power of all individuals together’ (TTP 16.4) should also lead him 
to accept premise (4′′). But he would apparently reject the conclusion (5′′), since ‘God alone 
is a free cause.’24 Once more, then, we have a Spinozist counterexample to Spinoza’s own 
argument at TTP 16.3-4. 
 
Case 3: Immutability. We have been considering cases in which Spinoza denies that 
finite individuals inherit (even to a limited degree) a metaphysical feature of the whole of 
nature, considered absolutely. Perhaps the clearest case is the property of immutability: 
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It follows [from the identity of God’s essence and existence] that God, or all God’s 
attributes, are immutable. For if they changed as to their existence, they would also 
(by 1p20) change as to their essence, i.e. (as is known through itself), from being true 
become false, which is absurd.  (E1p20c2) 
 
And since nature, considered absolutely, is identical with God (E1p29s), it too is 
immutable.25 On the face of it, then, it would be surprising for Spinoza to deny that 
particular, finite things are immutable as well. It is difficult to see how the whole of nature 
could be eternal and changeless if it is made up of temporal, changing things. Nevertheless, 
this is exactly Spinoza’s view. Nature, considered absolutely, is immutable, but particular 
things are generated and corrupted, and they undergo continuous change throughout their 
existence. Indeed, Spinoza takes continuous change to be required for the continued 
existence of a complex individual such as a human body: ‘The human Body, to be preserved, 
requires a great many other bodies, by which it is, as it were, continually regenerated’ 
(E2p13s, Post. IV). The very idea of an immutable living body is incoherent. 
 These facts again suggest an argument very similar to the one Spinoza uses to defend 
his account of natural right in the TTP. And yet again, the analogous argument is one that 
Spinoza would reject as invalid: 
(3''') Nature, considered absolutely, is immutable—its state is unchanging. 
(4''') The state of the whole of nature is nothing but the state of all individuals together. 
(5''') So, each individual’s state, whatever it may be, is unchanging, i.e., each thing is 
immutable. (from 3′′′, 4′′′) 
Premise (3′′′) is defended in the Ethics, in passages quoted above (E1p20c2 and 1p29s). And 
if Spinoza is prepared to accept that the power of nature reduces to the power of all 
individuals taken together—premise (4) of the original argument—it seems he should also 
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accept that the state of the whole of nature reduces to the states of all the individuals together 
(4′′′). Yet as in the previous cases, Spinoza clearly rejects the conclusion (5′′′), so he would 
reject this inference as invalid. The fact that nature (considered absolutely) has the 
metaphysical feature of immutability in no way entails that all things have that feature.  
 
The objection, then, is that there are a number of cases in which Spinoza would deny 
the validity of arguments with the same form as the TTP argument. This indicates that he 
should reject the validity of the TTP argument as well.  
It is worth considering a reply to this objection, motivated by an influential reading 
proposed by Don Garrett (2018) according to which Spinoza treats finite individuals as 
‘quasi-substances’ (377) or ‘finite approximations to substance’ (365). As Garrett observes, 
‘it is common for Spinoza to hold that finite things can have, in varying degrees, 
characteristics that only an infinite substance possesses absolutely’ (365). Indeed, Garrett 
motivates this proposal by pointing to the cases of existence and freedom that I appealed to 
above. Even though finite individuals do not possess either existence or freedom in the 
absolute sense that God has these properties, nevertheless individuals do have properties that 
are ‘finite approximations’ (365) of God’s existence and freedom. One reply to my objection, 
then, is that there are versions of each of the three conclusions given above—regarding 
essential existence, absolute freedom, and immutability—that would be acceptable to 
Spinoza. Finite individuals do possess such existence, freedom, and immutability, but only to 
a degree. So, likewise, finite individuals do possess a natural right coextensive with a degree 
of God’s power. 
I grant that this is a compelling interpretation; indeed, my reading of the TP argument 
in the next section will draw on it. However, it is not an adequate reply to the objection I 
have raised, for even on this reading, Spinoza would deny the validity of the arguments given 
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in cases 1-3. In order for those arguments to be valid as they stand, the property that finite 
things inherit must be one and the same as the property possessed by the whole of nature (as 
it is in the TTP argument, where the property in question is having right coextensive with its 
power). And that is something that, even on the quasi-substance reading, Spinoza would 
deny: the finite approximation of self-caused existence is not self-caused existence; the finite 
approximation of freedom is not freedom; and the finite approximation of immutability is not 
immutability. Thus the quasi-substance reading does not save the TTP argument. 
Moreover, now that we have seen a range of cases in which Spinoza would reject 
lines of reasoning analogous to the TTP argument, a second (and deeper) flaw in that 
argument also becomes apparent. Each of the arguments just outlined involves an illicit shift 
in the sense of the term ‘nature’, a term that Spinoza recognizes as ambiguous in the Ethics.26 
The initial premise in each case invokes nature considered absolutely, or natura naturans, 
which is prior to—and not composed of—particular finite things. However, the second 
premise in each case invokes a nominalistic conception of nature as composed of, and 
dependent on, finite things. In this sense, ‘nature’ refers to something like the infinite 
individual Spinoza describes in the Physical Digression after E2p13s, Lemma 7s.27 What is 
important for our purposes is that these distinct senses of ‘nature’ are not intersubstitutable. 
Nature (insofar as it is considered absolutely) is free, immutable, and has an existence 
identical with its essence.28 At the same time, nature (insofar as it is considered to be 
modified in various ways) is constrained, mutable, and has an existence distinct from its 
essence. This ambiguity is what makes it coherent for Spinoza to say that the activity of 
nature is the sum of the activity of all finite individuals (TTP 16.4), even though nature, 
insofar as it is substance, is indivisible (E1p13c&s). ‘Nature’ in the first claim refers to an 
infinite mode, while in the second claim it refers to God. It is also this ambiguity that allows 
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Spinoza to accept the premises in each of these three cases without accepting their 
conclusion.  
So far, so good for Spinoza. However, the same ambiguity in the term ‘nature’ is 
mirrored in premises (3) and (4) of the TTP argument. The problem is that in the context of 
that argument, we need ‘nature’ to retain the same sense in both of those premises. Since it 
does not retain the same sense throughout the argument, the argument is invalid. It relies on 
an inference that should be reckoned dubious even (and perhaps especially) given the 
metaphysical picture developed in the Ethics.  
 
4. REVISING THE ARGUMENT 
Although the TTP argument fails, Spinoza revises the argument in his last work, the 
Political Treatise. Some commentators have suggested that the revision makes for a stronger 
argument.29 We are now in a better position to appreciate why it is stronger: the TP argument 
is not subject to either of the logical flaws faced by its predecessor. 
If we enumerate the core premises of the TP argument, keeping close to the original 
text, it runs as follows. 
(6) God’s right over all things is nothing but his power itself insofar as that power is 
considered to be absolutely free.  
(7) The power of each natural thing, by which it exists and has effects, is nothing but the 
very power of God, which is absolutely free. 
(8) So, each natural thing has as much right by nature as it has power to exist and have 
effects. (from 6, 7) 
This argument clearly avoids the first flaw of the TTP argument. In particular, it does not 
involve an inference from the claim that all things are parts of a certain whole—the whole of 
nature—to the conclusion that they inherit the metaphysical features of that whole. Indeed, 
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the relationship between particular individuals and the whole of nature plays no role in this 
version of the argument. Instead, the argument depends only on the assumption that the 
power of each thing just is ‘the very power of God’. Since God’s power is identical with his 
right, it is supposed to follow directly that the power of each thing is coextensive with its 
right. 
 Does the TP argument also avoid the second problem, namely equivocation on 
Spinoza’s two senses of ‘nature’? Notably, since the argument does not appeal to the ‘whole 
of nature’ at all, there is no room in the argument for equivocating between the two senses of 
‘nature’, natura naturans and natura naturata. Only the power of God (natura naturans) is at 
issue throughout the argument. It thus avoids the charge of equivocation faced by its 
predecessor.  
There is a cost to Spinoza’s revision, however. In order to accept the identification of 
the power of each individual with the power of God, it seems that one must already endorse 
Spinozistic monism, or something very like it. That this premise would have been 
disagreeable to many of Spinoza’s readers—and that Spinoza was aware of this—is perhaps 
best illustrated by a series of late letters to and from Henry Oldenburg in 1675. Oldenburg 
requests that Spinoza ‘elucidate and moderate’ passages from the TTP ‘which appear to treat 
in an ambiguous way of God and Nature, which many people consider you have confused 
with each other’ (Ep. 71, 329). Although Oldenburg does not give a list of specific passages, 
the TTP argument is certainly a text in which such ‘confusion’ is evident. Spinoza responds,  
 
I entertain an opinion on God and Nature far different from that which modern 
Christians are wont to uphold. For I maintain that God is the immanent cause, as the 
phrase is, of all things, and not the transitive cause. All things, I say, are in God and 
move in God… (Ep. 73, 332) 
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This passage signals both that Spinoza recognizes that this presupposition about the 
relationship between God and natural things is contentious, but also that he is unwilling to 
drop it. Given this exchange, it is no surprise that the TP argument—composed roughly two 
years later—is not aimed at appealing to ‘modern Christians’ such as Oldenburg.  
To the contrary, we do best to read the TP argument as Spinoza’s attempt to set down 
the strongest defense of his account of natural right that he could provide, given the resources 
of the (by then fully fleshed-out) Ethics. The TTP is a much earlier work—one that Spinoza 
says he composed in order to combat ‘the prejudices of the theologians’ and to defend ‘the 
freedom to philosophise and to say what we think’ (Ep. 30, 185-186), but also to address the 
frequent accusations of atheism made against him ‘by the common people’ (Ep. 30, 186). 
Presumably he felt he could not finish work on the Ethics before quelling such accusations. 
However, after the publication of the TTP in 1670, Spinoza worked seriously on the Ethics 
for at least the next five years. By 1675, the latter work appears to have been close to its final 
form. In a letter to Spinoza dated 22 July of that year, Oldenburg refers to previous 
correspondence (not extant) that had indicated ‘your intention to publish the five-part 
Treatise of yours’ (Ep. 62, 294). And in his reply in September of that year, Spinoza confirms 
that he had been on the verge of having the work published, but demurred when ‘certain 
theologians’ raised complaints about his philosophy to various political leaders (Ep. 68, 321).  
Spinoza’s completion of the Ethics during this interval is significant because, 
although I have argued that the system he develops in that work does not validate the TTP 
argument, it does provide him with a more sophisticated way of understanding the 
immanence of God in all things. So, when Spinoza set himself the task of composing the 
Political Treatise sometime in 1675 or 1676,30 he approached the issue of natural right from a 
far more carefully developed metaphysical foundation: namely, the theory of inherence that 
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plays a central role throughout the Ethics. On this theory, the fact that all things are parts of 
the whole cosmos is irrelevant to the question of what properties they inherit from God. What 
matters is rather that all things inhere in God.31 It is this inherence relation that licenses 
Spinoza to treat particular individuals as quasi-substances (to follow Don Garrett’s 
terminology) whose power just is God’s power.  
To see this, note that the contentious premise of the TP argument—the premise that 
the power of each natural thing is nothing but the power of God—is a claim that Spinoza also 
makes explicitly in the Ethics: ‘[S]ingular things are modes by which God’s attributes are 
expressed in a certain and determinate way (by E1p25c), that is (by E1p34), things that 
express, in a certain and determinate way, God’s power, by which God is and acts’ 
(E3p6dem). And E1p25c, cited in support of this claim, is in turn derived from the 
proposition that ‘Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God’ 
(E1p15)—that is, all things inhere in God.  
In this way, Spinoza’s revisions to the TP argument suffice to make it valid against 
the background of his theory of inherence. For the revised argument is not drawn from the 
fact that all things are parts of one whole, but from the fact that all things express God’s 
power. These revisions thus reflect the fact that by the time he had begun work on the 
Political Treatise, he had carefully worked out his views about the metaphysics of inherence 




 My aim has been to set out an account of Spinoza’s reasons for revising his defense of 
the thesis that natural right is coextensive with power. I have argued that the TTP defense of 
this thesis is one that Spinoza ought not to have accepted even by his own lights. It illicitly 
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supposes that natural right is something that particular things must inherit by virtue of the 
fact that they are parts of the whole of nature (totius naturae). Spinoza’s metaphysics does 
not in general license such inferences, as a number of related examples from the Ethics attest. 
The properties of being free, of being immutable, and of being such that one’s existence is 
identical with one’s essence are all properties that particular finite individuals do not inherit 
simply by being part of the whole of nature. Moreover, considering these cases illuminates a 
second flaw in the argument: it trades on an ambiguity between the whole of nature 
considered as a substance (self-caused, indivisible, and free) and the whole of nature 
considered as a mode (caused by another, divisible, and constrained). When the ambiguity is 
straightened out, the argument flatly fails.  
However, I have also argued that the revised version of the argument presented in the 
TP avoids both of these pitfalls. It relies neither on a dubious inference from whole to part, 
nor on an equivocal conception of the whole of nature. Rather, the TP argument is based on a 
more metaphysically intimate connection between God and particular individuals: the fact 
that the power of each natural thing just is the power of God. Moreover, this key premise 
finds definite support in the Ethics, according to which ‘Whatever is, is in God’ (E1p15) and 
thereby expresses ‘in a certain and determinate way, God’s power, by which God is and acts’ 
(E3p6dem). Thus, although the TTP argument fails even when we take into account the 
broader metaphysical picture of the Ethics, the TP argument does not.  
The Tractatus Politicus, written at the very end of Spinoza’s life, provides us with his 
final attempt to argue that natural right is coextensive with power. The considerations 
presented here help us to understand Spinoza’s apparent dissatisfaction with his own previous 
efforts to do so. The revised argument avoids the logical pitfalls of his earlier efforts. It also 
more clearly reveals the deep roots by which the monistic metaphysics of the Ethics feeds 
into Spinoza’s conception of natural right.32 
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